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ABSTRACT 
 
Flying Qualities Built-In-Test for Unmanned Aerial Systems  
Alton P. Chiu 
 
 This paper presents a flying qualities built-in-test for UAS application. A doublet input 
waveform excites the AV and both α and q are used by EUDKF to estimate the A and B matrices 
which are short period approximations of the system. ζ, ω, GM, PM, observability, and 
controllability are calculated to determine flying qualities with the results displayed to the AVO 
in a color-coded, easy to interpret display. 
 While SID algorithms have been flying in vehicles with adaptive control schemes, vehicles 
with other schemes (such as classical feedback) lack this built-in self assessment tool. In addition, 
adaptive control SID results are not analyzed and displayed but instead used internally. This work 
intends to extend this self-assessment option to all UASs regardless of control scheme as a “plug-
and-play” add-on by building a reliable and robust tool that requires little tuning.  
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I. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
ATTLE damage or malfunctions can unpredictably compromise the airworthiness of an air 
vehicle. Furthermore, failure modes may be difficult to accurately model, analyze, and 
provide for. Given such challenges, the Flying Qualities Built-In-Test presented in this paper is 
invaluable in providing real-time qualitative metrics so that the air vehicle operator can decide 
whether to terminate the air vehicle or attempt a recovery.   
 Unmanned aerial systems face additional challenges compared to manned platforms in an off-
nominal state. Pilots of manned platforms enjoy high-rate quantitative cues (instrument readouts) 
in addition to having qualitative (seat-of-the-pants) feedback. Unmanned aerial system operators 
suffer from a limited quantitative dataset updated at low rates (due to comm.-link bandwidth 
limitations and time-delay). The lack of qualitative feedback also contributes to the degradation 
of situational awareness, leaving the operator with serious handicaps.  
 The Flying Qualities Built-In-Test addresses these shortcomings by reliably providing the 
operator with accurate real-time airworthiness assessment “at the click of a button”. Using system 
identification algorithms to estimate the state (?̂?𝐴) and input (𝐵𝐵�) matrix, robustness (gain and 
phase margin) and stability (damping ratio and frequency) are evaluated. Controllability and 
observability tests establish test validity. The results are concisely displayed to the operator with 
unequivocal recommendations. 
 Air vehicles with control schemes without an explicit system identification component lack 
the ability to diagnose flying qualities online. This work extends this self-assessment to all large 
unmanned systems (such as RQ-4) regardless of control schemes as a “plug-and-play” add-on.  
 For a copy of the MATLAB files accompanying this work, please contact the aerospace 
department at California Polytechnic State University, San Luis Obispo.   
B 
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II. INTRODUCTION 
he use of Unmanned Aerial Systems (UAS) has risen dramatically in recent years. While 
their robotic nature has them uniquely suited to missions with long-endurance 
requirements, the reduced risk to human operators has also thrust the UASs into an armed role. 
With the rise of responsibilities and strategic importance come mounting intellectual and 
monetary investments that must be conserved. The corresponding shift from their earlier 
disposable nature gives rise to the efforts to increase survivability. This section briefly discusses 
the history of UAS, previous efforts to increase survivability, and the solution that is the topic of 
this thesis.   
A. HISTORY 
The history of UAS is intertwined with manned aviation from the very start. UASs were used 
as technology demonstrators; their flights were used to analyze theory and ideas before 
implementation on manned versions. The Montgolfier Brothers flew the first living beings in a 
balloon to assess the effects of flight in 1783. A sheep was used as it was believed to reasonably 
approximate human physiology; a duck was expected to be unharmed and included as a control 
for the effects of the craft; a rooster was also included as a control as it was a bird that does not 
fly at high altitudes. Samuel Langley’s unmanned Aerodrome No.5, powered by a miniature 
steam engine, flew under its own power seven years before the Wright Flyer’s historic flight at 
Kitty Hawk. However, these early machines lacked the stability and guidance mechanisms found 
on modern UASs.   
By the end of the Great War, legends like the Sopwith Camel and Fokker DR.I had 
indisputably established the manned aircraft as a vital implement of war. Less known was the 
development of the UAS as cruise missiles. Only a decade after Kitty Hawk, Elmer Sperry had 
T 
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developed a gyro-based autopilot 
which provided the basis for the 
Hewitt-Sperry Automatic 
Airplane. Possessing a barometer 
to regulate altitude, gyroscope for 
heading tracking, gyroscopic 
stabilizers for stability, servo-
motors for control surface 
actuation, and engine RPM based 
distance measuring equipment, the 
Automatic Airplane possessed most of the same functional blocks as a modern UAS. A similarly 
equipped Kettering Bug (Figure 1) was designed for deployment at the Western Front. After 
flying at a predetermined height, the wings were detached at a predetermined distance and the 
explosive payload detonated upon impact. However, teething troubles and the armistice prevented 
its operational use. These early drones were characterized by their disposable nature and the pre-
programmed-only method of guidance. 
The interwar years saw advancement of technology in autopilot, television cameras, and radio 
remote-control. The autopilot system was refined to the point where the Norden bombsight could 
perform bomb-runs by issuing guidance commands to be executed by the autopilot. The pilot did 
not fly the bomber during the run, the bombardier only placed the crosshair on the target and fed 
information such as wind into the Norden bombsight; it performs the calculation of flight path 
and release point, and the required adjustments were issued to the autopilot. Television cameras 
and radio remote-control equipment allowed aircraft to be piloted remotely with a higher degree 
of feedback to the human operator. The Second World War sent these technologies into action in 
the form of self-guided (V-1 Flying Bomb) and remotely-piloted (Operation Aphrodite) UAS. 
 
Figure 1. Kettering Bug. 
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After the failure of the 
Luftwaffe to subdue the 
British Isles, Germany 
sought alternative methods 
of bringing war to the British 
population. One such 
solution was the Fieseler Fi 
103, also known as the V-1 Flying Bomb (illustrated in Figure 2). Like the Kettering Bug, the V-
1 possessed mechanisms that regulated course, altitude, speed and distance to detonation. While 
the mechanisms were more refined, the underlying concept remained the same. The V-1 executed 
a pre-programmed sequence-of-events, which could not be modified mid-flight by either the 
vehicle itself or human operators.  
On the other hand, the advent of television and improvements in radio-control allowed a UAS 
to attain closed-loop guidance. Operation Aphrodite was an Allied attempt at destroying the 
German V-weapons site with remotely-piloted B-17/24s laden with explosives. The takeoff and 
climb portions were performed by an on-board pilot. Once at cruise, the pilot bailed out and 
control was handed over to the remote pilot onboard a chase aircraft. A television camera aimed 
outside the windows gave the remote pilot situational awareness while another camera aimed at 
the instrument panel provided telemetry (hence the etymology of the word). The explosive 
aircraft was flown into the target by the remote pilot while he loitered in the chase aircraft outside 
the range of the defenses. While not very successful (one operation cost the life of Joseph 
Kennedy, older brother of John F. Kennedy), this early attempt at RPV provided the human-
machine interaction that was vital to modern UAS. It is noteworthy that these drones of WWII 
were disposable by nature and did not warrant the consideration of survivability.  
 
Figure 2. Fi 103. 
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The Cold War (and the various localized 
hot wars) saw the deployment of UAS as 
reconnaissance platforms. The D-21 
(pictured in Figure 3) is a Mach-3 capable 
drone designed for a one-way trip utilizing 
much of the same technology as the SR-71. 
After flying a pre-programmed route, the 
reconnaissance payload (camera and film) is 
ejected for recover, the drone then self-
destructs12.  
Up to this point, all the UASs discussed are disposable in nature; the Ryan Model 147 (Figure 
4) breaks new ground in being recoverable. Instead of ejecting the reconnaissance payload like 
the D-21, the entire vehicle parachutes to the ground at the recovery site18. The Ryan 147 is also 
notable in that it began replacing manned reconnaissance flights. After the loss of a U-2 during 
the Cuban Missile Crisis, Ryan 147s were almost used 
for reconnaissance until a decision to resume U-2 
flights was made just prior to the launching of the 
drones. In April 1969, an EC-121 was shot down 
during a SIGINT mission, killing all 31 onboard. The 
incident led to the 147T which flew under both 
internal guidance and controller instruction aboard the 
DC-130 launch aircraft through a communications 
datalink. This last element brought the UAS evolution 
from disposable “fire-and-forget” drones to the 
reusable, human-in-the-loop vehicles as we have 
 
Figure 3. D-21 atop an SR-71. 
 
 
Figure 4. Ryan 147. 
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come to associate with modern 
UAS such as the MQ-1 Predator.  
The Ryan 147 represented 
another first by adding weapons 
delivery to the repertoire of the 
UAS. Throughout the Vietnam 
War, SA-2 surface to air missiles 
presented a major threat to the 
US warplanes. Suppression of Enemy Air Defenses missions was undertaken by modified F-105 
and F-4s; losses among such units were especially high. The disposable nature of UASs lent itself 
well to undertaking these highly dangerous missions. In 1972, a Rayn 147 (depicted in this role in 
Figure 5) successfully delivered an AGM-65 Maverick electro-optical guided missile into a radar 
van mockup during test14. Although the system was never deployed operationally, the potential 
was recognized for armed UAS to soften up targets in the initial wave before the manned 
platforms strike40.  
After the Vietnam drawdown, the UAS development lapsed until the RQ-2 Pioneer brought 
UAS to the limelight during the 1991 Gulf War. A DOD report on Desert Shield and Storm 
credited the UAS with “direct and indirect gunfire support, day and night surveillance, target 
acquisition, route and area reconnaissance and BDA.”18 Such services led to Dick Cheney 
commenting that the RQ-2 “appears to have validated the operational employment of UAVs in 
combat.”7 The shortcomings discovered during the Gulf War and the promise shown by UASs led 
to the development of the RQ-1/MQ-1/MQ-9 Predator/Reaper in the medium altitude long 
endurance category and the RQ-4 Global Hawk in the high altitude long endurance area.  
 
Figure 5. Armed Ryan 147. 
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The RQ-1 Predator 
(pictured in Figure 6) 
provided intelligence in the 
forward observation role. In 
marked contrast to previous 
UASs, RQ-1 was capable of 
executing pre-programmed 
operations as well as being flown “stick-and-rudder” style by a remote pilot. In addition, it had 
been modified to carry munitions. In 2002, the designation was changed to MQ-1 (“M” for multi-
role) reflecting its growing use as an armed strike platform. The high demand of this vehicle is 
illustrated in Figure 7. This partly reflects the persistence requirements of the War on Terror, and 
partly the desire to reduce casualties. The long endurance capability of UASs not only lies in the 
airframe, but also with the human operators. Because operators can hand off control to one 
another in order to take a rest, human endurance no longer contributes to the equation. Because of 
the satellite link capability, the deployment cost is also lower in that human operators and their 
Figure 7. MQ-1 usage6.  
 
Figure 6. MQ-1 Predator. 
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attendant supply train need not 
be physically at the operational 
area.  
The RQ-4 (depicted in 
Figure 8) is similar in role and 
operational design as the U-2 by 
providing a theatre commander 
with broad overview and 
surveillance. While sharing much of the architectural design and advantages as the RQ-1, the 
guidance of the RQ-4 Global Hawk differs by dispensing with the “stick-and-rudder” capability. 
Instead, the human operator only issues outer loop commands to the autopilot, specifying desired 
altitude, airspeed, heading, etc.  
Both RQ-4 and RQ-1 have two major components to the system: the air vehicle and the 
ground station. The communications between the two are provided by either a satellite 
communications or a line-of-sight link. The line-
of-sight link, as the name implies, requires an 
unimpeded straight line between the air vehicle 
and the ground station. The range is limited by 
the power of the transmitter and the curvature of 
the Earth to about a hundred nautical miles.  
Referencing Figure 9, R is the radius of the 
Earth, h is the height of the air vehicle, and d is 
the geometric distance between the ground station (at sea level) and the air vehicle. Pythagorean 
Theorem gives the following relationship, 
 
Figure 8. RQ-4 Global Hawk. 
 
 
Figure 9. Earth horizon. 
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d2 = (R+h)2 – R2 = 2Rh + h2 
Since h is much less than R, d can be approximated as, 
𝑑𝑑 ≈ √2𝑅𝑅ℎ 
However, radio signals propagate in a curved line due to atmospheric diffractions. A factor k is 
used to adjust for this; under normal weather conditions, k of 4/3 is used. If h is given in m and d 
is in km, distance can further be simplified into  
𝑑𝑑 ≈ 4.12√ℎ 
If the air vehicle is flying at 7000ft, the range of the link is 100nmi. With buildings and terrain in 
sight, the air vehicle must be flying at medium altitude to maintain line-of-sight. The assumption 
of 100nmi is carried through for the rest of the latency analysis.  
The limited distance involved does have an upside in that the lag between a command input at 
the ground station and its execution at the air vehicle is markedly less than that achieved through 
a satellite link. The satellite link provides operational flexibility by allowing the air vehicle to be 
operated from almost anywhere in the world. However, this comes at the price of increased 
electrical power and physical space requirements for larger transmitters to reach the satellites. 
Both RQ-1 and RQ-4 have line-of-sight and satellite communications (KU band) capabilities.  
An idealized calculation can be made to show the difference in the latency. By neglecting 
atmospheric effects, which among other things, makes the propagation speed lower, the speed of 
the radio signal is idealized to be the speed of light (299,792,458 m/s). The range of a line-of-
sight link is assumed to be a hundred nautical miles. The satellite is assumed to be in 
geosynchronous orbit (35,786 km above the mean sea level) like most other communications 
satellites. Note that the command sent has to travel from the ground station to the air vehicle, and 
then the results have to travel back to the ground station; in other words, the distance concerned is 
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twice the physical 
distance between the 
human operator and the 
air vehicle. The 
calculations show a travel 
time of 1.2 milliseconds for a line-of-sight link and 0.24 seconds for a satellite link. While this 
does not account for other latency factors such as processing time, the numbers do illustrate that 
the satellite latency can be as much as three-orders of magnitude higher. The implications are 
immense for the “stick-and-rudder” controls of the RQ-1. The latency is in effect adding phase 
lag into the system which can easily lead to pilot induced oscillation during closed-loop high gain 
tasks like landings as shown by the operational history of the RQ-1 (discussed in the next 
section).  
Both RQ-1 and RQ-4 represent major monetary investments. Table 1 shows the cost of a selected 
few UASs described above. In addition to the dramatically higher cost, the technologies utilized 
 
 
Figure 10. UAS flight hours43. 
 
Table 1. UAS unit cost adjusted for FY2011. 
 Adjusted per Unit Price ($ millions) 
RQ-48 218 
MQ-13 56.1 
Ryan 14711 12.7 
D-2111 53.1 
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are also more sensitive. While a lost D-21 may allow opponents insight into the hypersonic 
engine or heat distribution, no vital electronics equipment or encryptions are endangered. In 
contrast, the low observable techniques applied on the RQ-170 lost near Iran in December 2011, 
negatively impacted a key component in the technological dominance of the US. The stakes in 
improving UAS survivability have increased along with rising cost and ever-increasing sensitivity 
of onboard technology.  
Meanwhile, the operations tempo has dramatically increased in the last decade. The 
exponential trend seen in the MQ-1 (Figure 7) is not limited to one system or service. Figure 10 
shows the exponential trend across all service. The rise of UAS in comparison with manned 
missions can be seen in Figure 11. While flight hours for manned assets have grown linearly, the 
hours for Predator/Reaper grow exponentially. The increased flight hours naturally lead to higher 
attrition rates, which is discussed in the next section.  
 As the UAS matured during the last century, it developed from disposable, one-use vehicles to 
 
 
Figure 11. CENTCOM ISR flight hours19. 
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intricate systems as expensive and strategically valuable as manned platforms. During the last 
decade, UASs were thrust into the frontlines of the War on Terror and saw their use increase 
exponentially. Given the high monetary and technology investments as well as the political 
sensitivity of their missions, UAS survivability has risen in importance from negligible to the 
front page of priorities.  
B. PROBLEM STATEMENT 
In face of unknown anomalies or battle damage, UAS pilots face additional challenges in 
diagnosing and 
correcting problems in 
comparison to their 
counterparts on manned 
platforms. Pilots of 
manned platforms enjoy 
high-rate quantitative 
cues in the form of 
instrument readouts. 
They also have the 
qualitative “seat-of-the-pants” feel. Since the data is displayed within the air vehicle, there is little 
to no lag in displaying system statuses; and with the modern electronic flight information 
systems, almost any parameter can be displayed to assist in troubleshooting. Even if the 
qualitative cues fail to provide sufficient information, the “seat-of-the-pants” feel might give 
clues that can help recover the air vehicle. In contrast, UAS operators are burdened with a limited 
data set with noticeable time delay. The communications link between the air vehicle and the 
ground station has limited bandwidth which restricts the number of parameters displayed to the 
 
Figure 12. UAS mishap rate. 
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operator. In addition, the satellite link entails latency in the tenth-second order. The negative 
implications upon the flying qualities of the system are illustrated in the next paragraph. 
The United States Air Force classifies mishaps according to severity into A, B, and C. Class A 
is the most severe category where the damage is more than $1,000,000, or the aircraft is damaged 
beyond repair, or fatal injury / permanent disability is incurred. A summary of all class A mishaps 
involving UASs is summarized in section A of the appendix and is plotted in Figure 12. The 
upward trend in Figure 12 matches the increased flight hours shown in Figure 11. Of these 
mishaps, there are five cases of pilot induced oscillations; all happened aboard the Predator 
family with the “stick-and-rudder” style control. One of the accident reports explicitly points to 
the fact that “the Predator’s lack of sensory cues contributed to the MP’s [mishap pilot] decision 
to continue to go-around attempt after the MRPA [mishap remotely piloted aircraft] had become 
unflyable.”1  
The restricted situational awareness of UAS not only causes trouble at closed loop high gain 
tasks, it also affects the troubleshooting ability of the operator. Because the operator was 
“confused over the flight characteristics of the MPRA [mishap remotely piloted aircraft], the MP 
[mishap pilot] erroneously concluded that there was a control problem…”2 During the 
troubleshooting process, the operator turned off the stability augmentation system which resulted 
in “the aircraft banking excessively in a nose down attitude, thereby losing its satellite 
communication link. The MP was unable to regain control of the aircraft, which subsequently 
impacted the ground.”2  
In order to increase survivability of the UAS, some function must exist onboard the vehicle to 
either adapt to the anomaly, or explicitly compare the current performance against the expected 
values in order to check for anomaly. These functions must occur on the vehicle due to the 
 14 
bandwidth limitation and latency of the communications link between the air vehicle and the 
ground station.  
 
C. ADAPTIVE CONTROL IS INSUFFICIENT 
Much work has been done 
in the field of adaptive control 
to account for anomalies. The 
advantage of adaptive control 
is that any reasonable 
anomaly will be washed-out 
and become transparent to the 
human operator. However, 
with the exception schemes 
with an embedded SID algorithm, none of the adaptive control schemes can easily lead insights 
into the flying qualities. 
Adaptive control schemes attempt to overcome plant or actuator uncertainties by adjusting the 
gains on-line. An example of adaptive control (explicit model following) is displayed in Figure 
13. One adaptive scheme that does not guarantee stability is mechanized as the Honeywell MH-
96 controller and is used on the third vehicle of the X-15 (the other two vehicles are fitted with 
conventional gain-scheduled controllers). The MH-96 increases the gain until limit cycle 
oscillations are observed, at which point the gain is lowered. As the gain approaches the critical 
level and the rudder chatter amplitude at the limit cycle frequency increases, the gain is lowered9. 
Theoretically, such a controller gives the highest performance possible by keeping the gain at 
critical level, while maintaining stability by lowering the gain when oscillation is observed. 
 
 
Figure 13. Explicit model following architecture. 
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However, this scheme does not guarantee stability; this fact is reflected in the 1967 crash of the 
X-15-3 during which the elevator entered into a limit cycle oscillation. There is no warning that 
the controller will fail; and the degradation is not graceful. 
Another adaptive scheme is the explicit model following scheme. Usually, the closed-loop 
behavior of the plant is used as the reference model. The control inputs are given to the reference 
model and the error between the model and the plant is used to drive the adaptive law. The law 
calculates the appropriate plant input so that the system behaves like the reference model. Such a 
scheme allows the control system to overcome anomalies such as loss of control effectiveness or 
nonlinearity. The stability of such a scheme is proven in a dissertation.20 Note that while stability 
and performance are maintained, there is no indication of how hard the controller is working to 
keep the air vehicle flying or how many margins there are; in other words, there is no way to 
characterize system robustness. 
Plant inversion is a modern control technique that, depending on implementation, can contain 
an adaptive flavor. Instead of driving the error between the model and the plant to zero, this 
scheme puts an inverted plant in-line with the plant to achieve pole-zero cancellation. After the 
system dynamics are taken out, pole placement is used to achieve desired dynamics. If the plant is 
non-minimum phase, the right-half plane zero becomes a right-half plane pole in the inverted 
plant. If the model of the plant is exactly correct, pole-zero cancellation occurs; otherwise, there 
exists a pole in the right-half plane resulting in an unstable closed-loop system. While accurate 
modeling can prevent such a disastrous occurrence, anomalies can unexpectedly change that. By 
adding an adaptive component in the form of a system identification algorithm, pole-zero 
cancellation can be reliably achieved42. Metrics on system robustness are calculable only in the 
case of adaptive plant inversion. 
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With the exception of adaptive schemes having an embedded SID algorithm, none of the 
control strategies can easily estimate the margins. While the performance of the closed loop 
system can be established by examining the reference model in explicit model following and pole 
placement techniques (even though the latter is not an adaptive scheme), the robustness cannot be 
easily established. For systems using other control schemes (such as traditional PID controllers), 
there is no easy way to obtain a flying qualities estimate on-line. FQ-BIT addresses this 
deficiency. 
D. FQ-BIT 
FQ-BIT remedies the deficiency by delivering a plug-and-play software package that is 
applicable to air vehicles with any control scheme: classical or modern, fixed-gain or adaptive. 
Once damage or anomalies occur, the control system is either capable of returning the air vehicle 
(AV) to straight and level flight, or it becomes uncontrollable. In the uncontrollable case, the AV 
either crashes despite best efforts, or the operator chooses to terminate without consulting FQ-
BIT due to time constraints. In either case, FQ-BIT is not involved in the decision process. 
If the AV is able to maintain straight and level flight after sustaining damage, the AVO can 
execute the FQ-BIT. If the AV is observable, controllable, stable, and robust, the AVO is advised 
to return-to-base (RTB). If the BIT is invalid, the AVO is advised to re-run the BIT. If the AV is 
not observable, controllable, stable, or robust, the AVO is advised to terminate the AV at the 
earliest opportunity. As the air vehicle approaches the landing phase, the AVO is advised to 
progressively step down in altitude and to execute FQ-BIT at each altitude step. This is done as a 
build up to the culminating event where the air vehicle simulates a landing approach at a safe 
flight condition in order to evaluate the flying qualities required for recovery. If the flying 
qualities are within acceptable limits, the AVO is advised to recover the air vehicle.  
The decision tree presented above is graphically summarized in Figure 14. 
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Figure 14. ConOps. 
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III. SYSTEM DESCRIPTION 
 
he architecture of the FQ-BIT is outlined in Figure 15. A known input waveform (u) is 
injected into the air vehicle and the pertinent states recorded (albeit corrupted by sensor 
error into y+ε). The SID algorithm outputs a linear estimation of the air vehicle dynamics (?̂?𝐴,𝐵𝐵�), 
which are then evaluated by the flying qualities analysis block, and the metrics are displayed to 
the air vehicle operator (AVO). FQ-BIT assumes that the longitudinal and lateral modes of the 
UAS are decoupled, and estimates them separately. Because the roll and yaw axis are coupled, 
they are estimated together in the lateral axis.  
Given the limited communications bandwidth available between a UAV and the ground 
station, FQ-BIT process data onboard the AV and only transmit the results to the ground station. 
As such, FQ-BIT must be computationally simple so as not to burden the flight computers. This 
requirement not only influences the SID algorithm selection, but also the order of the estimation 
model. This implication is further discussed in SID algorithm subsection below. 
T 
 
 
Figure 15. FQ-BIT architecture. 
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The following subsections detail the theory and mechanization of each block illustrated in 
Figure 15; the process of arriving at these choices is discussed in the results and analysis sections.  
A. INPUT WAVEFORM 
The purpose of the input waveform (u) is to excite the plant so that output states can be 
measured for use by the system identification algorithm. An optimal waveform choice maximizes 
the informational content in all the output states. At the same time, the waveform should avoid 
destabilizing the plant with too much input energy.  
Most modern air vehicles, manned or unmanned, exhibit open-loop relaxed stability or even 
instability; this in turn requires the control system to be operating at all times. The dynamic 
instability stems from a wide variety of requirements, from maneuverability (high rates can be 
achieved with an unstable system, as exemplified with the Lockheed F-22), to low-observability 
(shape of the airframe as determined by radar signature may not be aerodynamically stable, such 
as the case for the Northrop B-2), and even aerodynamic efficiency (lower trim-drag can be 
achieved with low static-stability margin, as was done with the Airbus A-320). With this in mind, 
the input waveform must excite 
the closed-loop dynamics of 
both the airframe and control 
system. 
 Three artificial waveform 
candidates (pulse, 3-2-1-1, 
doublet) and one natural 
waveform candidate 
(turbulence) were considered for 
use by FQ-BIT. After a selection 
 
 
Figure 16. Doublet Input 
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process discussed in the appropriate subsections of section IV, V, and VI, the Doublet waveform 
(depicted in Figure 16) was chosen for its balance of stability and accuracy. The amplitude is 
tuned as a compromise between exciting the system enough to produce good estimates, and 
avoiding destabilizing the system.  For the longitudinal axis, the doublet is injected only to the 
elevator. For the lateral axis, the doublet is injected into the both aileron and rudder. The aileron 
is first perturbed, then fifteen seconds later the rudder is perturbed. The separation between the 
aileron and rudder perturbation allows for the transient motions to dampen out so as not to corrupt 
the results of the rudder estimation results.  
B. AIR VEHICLE PLANT 
 Large UASs serve strategically 
important roles in intelligence-
surveillance-reconnaissance and strike 
missions are reflected in the large 
monetary and intellectual investments 
(the reader is referred to the history 
subsection of the introduction for 
statistical information). In addition, 
their large size is more likely to cause casualties in the event of a mishap. Given this, FQ-BIT is 
focused on serving large UASs; the comparative size of a large UAS is illustrated by an RQ-4A 
in company with a thirteen passenger Beechcraft C-12 in Figure 17.  
C. SENSOR 
 The air vehicle must have sensors to measure the following longitudinal states [α, q] and 
lateral states [β, ϕ, p, r] for use by the SID algorithm. In addition, all perturbed control surface 
positions [δe, δa, δr] must also be measured and recorded; this requirement should be easily 
 
Figure 17. RQ-4A. 
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fulfilled as most actuators already incorporate a position measurement for use in their internal 
command tracking control system. Likewise, the Euler angle rates [p,q,r] and roll angle [ϕ] 
should easily be obtainable from the onboard navigational unit(s). The angles between the body 
and stability axis [α, β] are more difficult to obtain accurately.  
In comparison to the other measurement requirements, [α, β] are not necessarily required by 
the basic control architecture. While one can safely assume the navigational and actuator needs 
will provided [p,q,r,ϕ] and [δe, δa, δr] to FQ-BIT at no additional cost, [α, β] are not required by 
any function. The control system may require them for stability augmentation, but that necessity 
cannot assuredly exist on all UAS of concern. As such, FQ-BIT levies additional requirements on 
the UAS to either possess α and β sensors, or to have a method of synthesizing the measurements 
with a state estimator. Note that the following equations 
α = θ – γ 
β = ψ – ground track 
are unsuitable for FQ-BIT use. The α equation is only valid for wings-level straight and level 
flight, and the transients during a pitch doublet make that calculation invalid. The β equation is 
invalid because it assumes that no wind exists (in other words, the air mass is not moving). While 
wind may be correct for post-flight with accurate weather information, it is impractical to do so in 
an operational environment real-time.  
D. SID ALGORITHM 
The system identification (SID) component estimates the plant which is then analyzed for 
flying qualities. SID algorithm assumes the lateral and longitudinal dynamics of the air vehicle 
are decoupled and processes them separately. For the longitudinal mode, the states [α,q] and input 
δe are used for SID. For the lateral mode, the states [β,ϕ,p,ψ,r] and the input [δa,δr] are used.  
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Three candidates (equation error in time domain, equation error in frequency domain, and 
Extended UD Factorized Kalman Filter) are evaluated in the appropriate subsections of section 
IV, V, and VI with EUDKF being chosen for use. The following paragraphs describe the 
implementation of EUDKF in detail. 
1. Extended UD Factorized Kalman Filter 
 The system identification (SID) algorithm of choice is the Extended Kalman Filter in UD 
factorized form (hereafter referred to 
as EUDKF), which is a member of the 
Kalman Filter family. Kalman Filter 
uses statistical probability to meld the 
measurements and the model together. 
It is a recursive process that assumes a 
Gaussian white noise distribution. The 
Kalman Filter only operates upon the 
data one time step prior and hence has 
low memory access requirement; in 
contrast, batch filters require the entire 
measurement and hence have high 
memory access requirement. Although 
generally applied towards state estimation, the Kalman Filter family can also be used for system 
identification by augmenting the state matrix with the elements of A and B matrices.  
The Kalman Filter architecture is displayed in Figure 18. From the last state estimate, the state 
is propagated forward in time using the state transition matrix ϕ such that x�k+1 = 𝜙𝜙x�k , where ϕ is 
given as the matrix exponential of the state matrix A (ϕ=eAt) . To save computational resources, a 
truncated Taylor series expansion of the exponential can be used such that eAt = I+At. 
 
 
Figure 18. Kalman filter architecture. 
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Alternatively, any numerical technique (such as the fourth-order Runge-Kutta scheme) can be 
used to propagate the states as ?̇?𝑥 = 𝐴𝐴𝑥𝑥. Since any nth-order ordinary differential equation can be 
written as n-number of 1st order differential equations, the solution to any nth-order ordinary 
differential equation can be written as a matrix exponential problem. While the states are 
propagated, the covariance matrix P is also extrapolated. This P is used in the measurement 
update step. As implemented in FQ-BIT, the initial augmented state matrix guess is that of the 
initial states augmented by the nominal A and B matrices, and the initial covariance P is guessed 
to be 50%.  
Q is the covariance matrix of process noise. It is mathematically represented as a square matrix 
of size nxn if the state vector is of size nx1. Tuning of the Kalman Filter can be performed by 
adjusting the magnitude of each Q element. Each noise injection must be proportional to the 
magnitude of each individual state. Assuming a state vector of [10; 1000], the diagonal of the Q 
matrix could be a scalar multiple of [1; 100]. If improper noise magnitudes are specified, the 
Kalman Filter could track the largest magnitude state(s) and ignore others. Too little excitation 
could lead to filter “smugness” in which the filter erroneously trusts the model too much and does 
not pay attention to the measurement updates. Alternatively, too much excitation could drive the 
system unstable.   
Once the state is propagated to the next time step, and the state measurements are available 
through the sensor, the next step is to combine the two. Using statistical probability, the Kalman 
gain K is calculated using a combination of the covariance matrix P, predefined measurement 
noise matrix R, and sensor matrix C such that 𝐾𝐾 = 𝑃𝑃� − 𝐶𝐶𝑇𝑇[𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑃�𝐶𝐶𝑇𝑇 + 𝑅𝑅]−1. If the covariance is 
high, this indicates a high confidence in the model or the filter considers the measurement is an 
outlier; as such, K approaches zero and the measurement is ignored. The states are updated using 
the Kalman gain as such, 𝑥𝑥� = 𝑥𝑥� + 𝐾𝐾[𝑦𝑦𝑚𝑚 − 𝐶𝐶𝑥𝑥�], where ym is the measurements. After this, the 
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covariance matrix is updated as well using the equation 𝑃𝑃� = [𝐼𝐼 − 𝐾𝐾𝐶𝐶]𝑃𝑃� where I is the identity 
matrix.  
The “Extended” flavor of the Kalman Filter differs by having an A matrix linearization step at 
each iteration, whereas the plain Kalman Filter has a predefined, fixed A matrix. The linearization 
step allows the filter to account for plant non-linearity. In the FQ-BIT implementation, the 
linearized A matrix is found by numerically taking the Jacobian of the non-linear function around 
the current states (first-order accurate in the Taylor series expansion sense); the sensor matrix 
could be likewise linearized if necessary. An Extended Kalman Filter is a non-optimal solution 
for nonlinear systems because it uses a linear approximation of a nonlinear system. In contrast, 
plain Kalman Filter is the optimal solution for a linear system as no system approximation is 
utilized. The Extended Kalman Filter also incurs penalties in the form of computational 
requirements associated with the linearization step. As implemented in FQ-BIT, each element of 
the Jacobian matrix is calculated by the central difference method where ?̇?𝑓 = 𝑓𝑓(𝑥𝑥+∆𝑥𝑥)−𝑥𝑥(𝑥𝑥−∆𝑥𝑥)2∆𝑥𝑥 . 
The states are propagated forward using the matrix exponential method.  
Rounding errors can cause the Kalman Filter to diverge. If the covariance matrix P has a small 
positive eigenvalue to be computed as zero or a negative number, it thereby turns the covariance 
matrix P indefinite (it should be positive-definite). The UD factorized flavor of the Kalman Filter 
addresses this problem by operating on P in a unit-triangular and diagonal (UD) decomposed 
form. Because P is a positive-definite matrix, the square-root can be calculated. By performing 
operations on the square-root and then recombining, P is guaranteed to be positive-definite. 
However, square-root operations are slightly more expensive than the divisions used by the UD-
decomposition37. UD-decomposition retains the numerical properties of the square-root while 
requiring less computational resources. P can be decomposed using the following equation 
P=UDUT where U is the unit-triangular component and D is the diagonal component.  The bonus 
 25 
of such factorization comes in storage space requirements: UD-decomposition requires only half 
the word length compared to explicitly calculating P.  
Divergence could occur due to things like incorrect initial guesses, nonlinearity, and rounding 
error; EUDKF and tuning strategies are chosen to avoid such problems. To handle incorrect 
initial guesses, the output from other SID algorithms can be used to initialize the KF; but this 
negates the advantage of a recursive process. As implemented in FQ-BIT, EUDKF makes an 
initial guess with the nominal values and 50% covariance. While the large initial covariance can 
increase convergence time, the increased robustness is worth the trade-off. The mechanization of 
the EUDKF is summarized below.  
State and Covariance Propagation 
The State Vector propagates through time according to the transition matrix ϕ where 𝑥𝑥� is the 
current state estimate, 𝑥𝑥� is the extrapolated state at the next time step, and 𝑤𝑤𝑘𝑘  is the process noise. 
(1) 
Using the definition of covariance matrix P(k) = E{x(k)T x(k)} and the assumption that state error 
and process noise (Q) are uncorrelated, the error covariance matrix can be written as  
(2) 
However, explicitly calculating P could lead to divergence, so the upper triangle term U and 
diagonal term D are introduced such that  
(3) 
With the following definitions:  
 V = [ϕ𝑈𝑈� | G] 
VT = [v1, v2,..., vn] 
𝐷𝐷�= diag[𝐷𝐷�,Q] 
The extrapolated P can be written as  
(4) 
( ) ( ) ( ) kwkxkkkx ++=+ ˆ1,1~ φ
( ) ( ) TT GQGkPkP +=+ φφ ˆ1~
TUDUP ˆˆˆˆ =
TVDVP ~~~~ =
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where U and D are recursively calculated with the following algorithm. 
for (j=1...number of states) { 
 
   for (i=1...j-1) { 
 
 
   }  
} 
 
Linearization 
Note that for a non linear system described by the following state equations where Θ is the vector 
of unknown parameters,  
(5) 
(6) 
EKF linearizes the system around the current estimate such that, 
 
(7) 
 
(8) 
And the transition matrix is given as, 
(9) 
Hence the extrapolated state vector can be found using equation 1 using ϕ from the equation 9. 
 
Measurement Update  
After a new measurement is available, K the Kalman gain is calculated as such, 
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where R is the measurement noise covariance matrix. The state and error covariance matrix is 
updated with the following equations. ym is the measurement. The sensor matrix C used is from 
equation 8.   
(10) 
(11) 
 
2. 𝑨𝑨�,𝑩𝑩�  Matrix Size 
A lower-order estimation is used for FQ-BIT in the longitudinal states in order to reduce 
computational requirements. Textbooks typically linearize air vehicle plants into four states: 
[VTAS,α,θ,q] in the longitudinal mode and five states [β,ϕ,p,ψ,r] in the lateral mode, and inputs 
are linearized to two states [δe,δth] in the longitudinal mode and two states [δa,δr] in the lateral 
mode25, 35. However, the physics of large UAS allow an order reduction to just [α, q] in the plant 
and [δe] for the input. 
[ ]PKCIP ~ˆ −=
[ ]xCyKxx m ~ˆˆ −+=
 
 
Figure 19. Typical UAS control system. 
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A typical control system for 
UAS is illustrated in Figure 19. 
In the longitudinal mode, the 
autopilot forms a tight inner 
loop with altitude and airspeed 
tracking. This augmentation 
effectively suppresses the 
phugoid mode. This is 
illustrated in Figure 20 where 
the open-loop dynamics is that 
of a Cessna 172 (shown in the 
appendix) with an initial 
VTAS disturbance of 5kt; the 
augmentation is achieved through pitch rate feedback architecture with a gain of 20 in the 
feedback path.  
The Phugoid is a “slow” mode in comparison to the short period mode with the dynamics 
primarily showing up in the VTAS and θ states. Similarly, the throttle input has a comparatively 
higher lag time than the elevator and only minimally affects the short period. The long period 
(roughly forty seconds in Figure 20) in comparison to the maneuver length (fifteen seconds), as 
well as the fact that the autopilot / inner-loop controller is never disengaged on a UAS; the 
phugoid mode can be removed from the longitudinal estimation. Hence, the state vector is 
reduced to [α, q] and input vector reduced to [δe]. The five lateral states cannot be reduced 
because all states are necessary to capture the coupled rolling and yawing motions.  
 
Figure 20. Phugoid suppression. 
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Because of the tight inner-loop controller, the phugoid mode can be ignored. The relevant 
longitudinal states and input are [α, q] and [δe]; the relative lateral states and inputs are [β,ϕ,p,ψ,r] 
and [δa,δr]. 
E. FQ ANALYSIS 
To access the flying qualities (FQ) of the air vehicle, the stability / performance, robustness, 
controllability, and observability of the system must be determined. Since the SID algorithm 
outputs the linear closed-loop dynamics of the air vehicle in the state-space form, all analysis will 
be performed in the state-space form as well.  
1. Stability / Performance 
The pole locations (in the Laplace domain) or eigenvalues of A (in state-space representation) 
determine the stability of the system. Considering the system with no external input or 
disturbances so that  ?̇?𝑥 = 𝐴𝐴𝑥𝑥, the system is stable if and only if all eigenvalues of A are inside the 
left half of the complex plane. In other words, the real parts of the eigenvalues of A are all 
negative. Assuming A is diagonalizable with all the eigenvalues in the left half plane, the 
following relationship exists:  
‖𝑒𝑒𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴‖ ≤ 𝑘𝑘0𝑒𝑒𝜎𝜎𝐴𝐴  
where k0 is the condition number and σ is the largest real eigenvalue of A. Because all the 
eigenvalues of A are in the left half plane, σ < 1. Multiplying both sides of the inequality with the 
magnitude of the initial state x0, and applying the fact that the solution ?̇?𝑥 = 𝐴𝐴𝑥𝑥 to is  𝑥𝑥 = 𝑒𝑒𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑥𝑥0, 
the following can be seen: 
‖𝑒𝑒𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑥𝑥0‖ ≤ 𝑘𝑘0𝑒𝑒𝜎𝜎𝐴𝐴 ‖𝑥𝑥0‖ 
‖𝑥𝑥(𝐴𝐴)‖ ≤ 𝑘𝑘0𝑒𝑒𝜎𝜎𝐴𝐴 ‖𝑥𝑥0‖ 
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If the system is exponentially stable the steady-state norm of x(t) should be zero as time 
approaches infinity. Observing the right hand side of the equation above, one can see that the 
quantity approaches zero as time approaches infinity because of the negative exponential (σ is a 
negative number). Thus, the following relationship exists: 
𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑚𝑚
𝐴𝐴→∞
‖𝑥𝑥(𝐴𝐴)‖ ≤ 𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑚𝑚
𝐴𝐴→∞
𝑘𝑘0𝑒𝑒𝜎𝜎𝐴𝐴 ‖𝑥𝑥0‖ lim
𝐴𝐴→∞
‖𝑥𝑥(𝐴𝐴)‖ ≤ 0 
However, the definition of a vector norm states that ‖𝑥𝑥(𝐴𝐴)‖ ≥ 0. For both the relationship derived 
above and the vector norm definition to be true, the following must be true, 
lim
𝐴𝐴→∞
‖𝑥𝑥(𝐴𝐴)‖ = 0 
Hence, given the system with dynamics such that  ?̇?𝑥 = 𝐴𝐴𝑥𝑥, the system is stable if and only if the 
real part of all the eigenvalues of A are negative. 
Armed with the knowledge above, the stability of the system is easily established. As 
implemented in FQ-BIT, the eigenvalues of the A matrix is calculated and the real and imaginary 
parts are determined. If all the real parts of the eigenvalues are negative, then the system is stable. 
However, the FQ-BIT does not explicitly check for stability as a Boolean. Instead, this is 
implicitly established along with performance section.   
The flying qualities of an air vehicle are specified in 
damping frequency (ωd) and damping ratio (ζ) for second 
order responses, time constants (τ) for first order 
responses in MILSPEC 8785. Since the desirable metrics 
derive from stable systems, metrics from unstable systems 
will lie outside the desirable region along with stable 
 
Figure 21. FQ stability metrics. 
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systems that do not perform up to par. Hence, by just analyzing the flying qualities metrics, the 
stability and performance of the air vehicle can both be established at the same time.  
For a second order response, the damping frequency and ratio can be calculated based upon 
the pole locations. The relationship is illustrated in Figure 21. The imaginary part of the 
eigenvalue is the damping frequency. The modulus of the eigenvalue gives the natural frequency. 
The real part of the eigenvalue is the product of the damping ratio and natural frequency. The 
short-period, Dutch-Roll, and Phugoid modes are second order responses and can be analyzed 
with this method.  
For first order response, approximations are needed to convert the pole locations to time 
constants. Note that poles for first order responses lie on the real axis of the root locus plot; thus, 
the damping frequency is zero and damping ratio is one. Observe that the magnitude of the 
eigenvalue is the natural frequency of the first order response. The following approximations25  
between time constant, rise time, and the natural frequency, and eigenvalue (λ) are used to 
calculate the metric, 
𝐴𝐴𝑟𝑟 ≅
1 + 1.1𝜁𝜁 + 1.4𝜆𝜆2
𝜔𝜔𝑛𝑛
= 3.5|𝜆𝜆|  
𝜏𝜏 ≅ �1 − 1
𝑒𝑒
� 𝐴𝐴𝑟𝑟
2.2|𝜆𝜆| 
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The desirable flying qualities for manned platforms are outlined in MILSPEC 8785. However, 
these requirements are written for pilots having direct “stick-and-rudder” inputs to the UAS; 
while having relevance to a remotely-piloted-capable platform such as the RQ-1/MQ-9, it is not 
pertinent to the RQ-4 with “keyboard-and-mouse” inputs. The difference in input style is 
illustrated in Figure 22. With the RQ-4 style of inputs, the human operator is issuing high level 
commands like desirable heading and altitude while the inner-loop autopilot is performing the 
tracking task; in the RQ-1, the human operator both issues high level commands and performs 
tracking. Because of different styles of human-machine interface, the desirable flying qualities are 
left to the UAS designers to specify.  
Because different turbulence conditions might impose different response times, the desirable 
performance metrics are split into three progressively stringent categories of light, medium, and 
heavy turbulence. The performance metrics calculated from the SID algorithm output are 
compared against the requirements and the result is a “go / no-go” for flight in different 
atmospheric conditions.  
 
 
Figure 22. Keyboard-and-Mouse vs. Stick-and-Rudder 
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2. Robustness 
Even if the system is 
found to be stable with 
adequate performance, 
robustness must still be 
established. Robustness 
assures stability even if the 
results from the SID 
algorithm have up to 6db 
and 45degs of errors in gain 
and phase. Referencing the 
system architectural diagram in Figure 15, error sources can be identified. Sensor error (ε) in form 
of bias, scaling, noise, or nonlinearity corrupts the state outputs. This has the cascading effect on 
the SID results. In addition, the SID algorithm introduces process noise by estimating a linear, 
reduced-order model since the “real-world” is non-linear with an infinite number of states. While 
the SID algorithm is tuned to give the best results despite these errors (described in the relevant 
test and analysis sections), margins must be built in. 
The robustness of the system is characterized by the gain and phase margins. Gain margin 
indicates the amount of error in the modeled magnitude before system instability occurs. 
Assuming a linear representation at an input of 1 is output = 3 x input, and the system has 6dbs of 
gain margin, then it can be said that the model (amplification of 3) can have 6dbs of error (i.e., 
true amplification can be as high as 6) before the system becomes unstable. The instability is a 
result of the phase being 180degs apart where negative feedback becomes positive feedback. On 
the other hand, phase margin indicates the amount of error in the modeled phase before instability 
occurs. Assuming a modeled phase margin of 45degs, then the true phase lag can have an 
 
 
Figure 23. Bode Plot 
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additional 135degs before instability occurs due to the feedback switching sign. Gain and phase 
margins are determined from the Bode plot; their relationship is illustrated in Figure 23. The 
reader is referred to textbooks25, 35 for further explanation.  
MILSPEC 9490 defines the desirable gain and phase margins as 6db and 45degs respectively. 
Since there is no fundamental difference between manned and unmanned platforms regarding 
robustness, these criteria are adopted for determining robustness of the system. Once the 
robustness of the air vehicle is determined, a Boolean flag indicates to the human operator 
whether the system has the required 6dbs and 45degs robustness.  
3. Observability 
Observability is critical to the function of the control system. Given an observable system, the 
current states can be determined in finite time using the observed outputs. Alternatively, this 
means that it is possible to determine system behavior given the outputs available. If the system is 
unobservable, then some of the output values are not known to the controller and cannot fulfill 
the control specifications.  
Since the SID algorithm output a linear time-invariant state-space representation of the closed-
loop air vehicle, the observability matrix (O) is constructed as such where n is the number of 
states: 
 
 
 
If the rank of the observability matrix is n (in other words, full rank), then each row is linearly 
independent and each state can be determined; thus the system is observable. The operator is 
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informed if the system is observable. If the system is unobservable and no sensor faults are 
indicated, then the FQ-BIT results are invalid and should be re-performed as soon as practical.  
4. Controllability 
Controllability is the mathematical dual of observability. Given a controllable system, then the 
states can be changed from one to another in a finite amount of time. Alternatively, this is a 
measure of whether all the states can be altered by a combination of inputs. If the system is 
uncontrollable, the control system cannot change all the relevant parameters of the flight path, 
which presents a danger to both the air vehicle and the surroundings.  
Given a linear time-invariant state-space representation of a system, the controllability matrix 
(R) where n is the number of states can be written as such: 
 
If R is full rank, then there are n numbers of linearly independent columns and all the states are 
reachable given a combination of inputs; thus the system is controllable. The operator is informed 
if the system is controllable.  
F. AVO INTERFACE 
The raw, numerical, results from FQ analysis in subsection E, while providing a wealth of 
engineering information, should not be directly displayed to the air vehicle operator (AVO).  
Instead of overwhelming a presumably stressed operator with a deluge of numbers, the results are 
presented as a series of “go / no-go”, respectively green and red, flags so that the pilot can 
determine the flying-qualities in a glance. The interface is displayed in Figure 24.  
[ ]BABAABBR n 12 −= 
 36 
Area I allows the AVO to select the axis to be tested; if both axes are selected, longitudinal 
will be tested first, then lateral. The execute button in area II is used to initiate the test(s) selected 
in area I. Area III is the detail status button which allows the AVO to thoroughly examine the 
results (further elaborated in the next paragraph). Area IV indicates whether the AV is safe to 
operate in differing levels of turbulence. If all three columns are green, then the AV is safe to 
operate in conditions up to heavy turbulence; if the light and medium columns are green but the 
heavy column is red, then the AV is unsafe to operate in the presence of heavy turbulence. If all 
three columns are red, the AVO is advised to terminate the AV as soon as practical. Area V 
displays other flying qualities metrics. Observability and controllability should be green for a safe 
recovery. If observability is red while no sensor faults are indicated, then the invalid flag will turn 
red in area VI. If either gain or phase margin flags turn red, the AVO is advised to terminate. 
Area VI displays the validity as well as termination recommendation. If the results are invalid, the 
operation should re-execute FQ-BIT at the earliest convenience. If any of the aforementioned 
criteria for termination are met, the terminate flag will light up and the AVO is advised to 
terminate. The FQ-BIT will not automatically terminate the AV. 
 
 
Figure 24. AVO interface. 
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The detail status display is illustrated in Figure 25. This corresponds to a scenario in which the 
AVO observes red items in area IV and V, and further investigates before deciding upon a course 
of action. Both Yaw and Roll are red boxed because at least one metric failed to meet the 
requirements. In the yaw axis, one observes that the damping frequency lies outside of the 
acceptable range for heavy turbulence and the damping ratio is inadequate for anything but light 
turbulence. In the roll axis, there is insufficient gain margin. Given this information, the operator 
can make an informed decision. 
 A few scenarios are presented for reference. Figure 26 displays a nominal scenario where 
no restrictions are implied.  
Figure 27 shows a scenario in which it is inadvisable to operate in the presence of medium or 
heavy turbulence. Figure 28 shows a scenario in which the AV is no longer airworthy and should 
be terminated. Figure 29 illustrates a scenario where FQ-BIT returns an invalid result. 
 
 
Figure 25. Detail Status. 
 
 38 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 27. Restricted. 
 
 
 
Figure 26. Nominal. 
 
 39 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
Figure 29. Invalid. 
 
 
 
Figure 28. Terminate. 
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IV. Test Suites 
A. Air Vehicle Plant (Characterization) 
The air vehicle plant used for evaluating the candidates is split into two cases: linear and non-
linear. In both cases, the longitudinal and lateral dynamics are assumed to be uncoupled. The 
plants chosen represented an air vehicle comparable in size to a large UAS; the flight conditions 
are selected to be at the heart of the envelope. In the linear case, a Cessna 172 at an altitude of 
5000ft and airspeed of 120kts is used. For the nonlinear case, an F-16 at an altitude of 20000ft 
and airspeed of 400kts is modeled. The six degrees-of-freedom nonlinear model of the F-16 is 
based on the information in Aircraft Control and Simulation35 and improved by the Software 
Enabled Control group at the University of Minnesota34.  
The linear model of the Cessna 172 is presented in the appendix section B. For the 
longitudinal case, four states are simulated [VTAS,α,θ,q]. Note that only two longitudinal states 
are estimated by the SID algorithm, so process noise is intentionally introduced to assess the 
supposition that Phugoid mode can be neglected. The lateral model simulates five states 
[β,ϕ,p,ψ,r], all of which are used by the SID algorithm.  
 
B. Sensor (Characterization) 
Sensor error corrupts the input to the SID algorithm and may affect the accuracy of its 
solution; hence, these errors must be modeled in order to accurately evaluate the candidates. 
Several types of errors are displayed in Figure 30. Noise, not graphed, corrupts the truth value 
with undesirable random perturbations. Bias error indicates a constant offset from the truth value; 
for example, the truth is y=x while the sensor readout is y+ε=x+2. A scaling error is an error in 
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the slope; for example, the 
truth is y=3x while the 
sensor readout is y+ε=2x. 
Nonlinearity error indicates 
that while the sensor 
readout is approximately 
equal to the truth over a 
range of values, the error 
nonlinearly expands outside 
said range; for example, the 
truth is y=tan(x) while the 
sensor readout is y+ε=x. Quantization error occurs during an analogue-to-digital conversion 
where the resolution is not high enough to fully describe the analogue function.  
Scaling errors often happen when the output units (e.g. volts) are not correctly translated to 
engineering units (e.g. ft). This error is not inherent to any sensor and is likely to be discovered 
and rectified before the air vehicle is put into service. Therefore, scaling error is ignored for the 
purpose of these evaluations. The same argument goes for nonlinearity, and thus is left out of the 
analysis. With the advanced electronics, it is safe to assume that the sampling bins are fine 
enough to make quantization an inconsequential issue. Bias and noise are the two consequential 
components that are modeled for evaluation. 
The states required by the SID algorithm can be gathered by two subsystems. [VTAS,α,β] can 
be gathered by the air data system (ADS), and [θ,q,ϕ,q,ψ,r] can be gathered through the inertial 
navigation unit (INS), specifically the rate sensors. While [α,β] can be estimated using inertial 
navigation outputs, the results are only valid for steady-state flight in the case of α and zero-wind 
 
 
Figure 30. Sensor error types. 
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in the case of β. As neither assumption is appropriate for FQ-BIT, the errors from both INS and 
ADS are investigated. 
1. INS 
In addition to the aforementioned errors, mechanical misalignment, stress deformation, and 
temperature are contributors to sensor errors. Mechanical misalignment errors stem from the 
accelerometers / rate-gyros not being perfectly orthogonal to each other. This error is disregarded 
because it is largely constant and can be filtered out by sensor-fusion algorithms (namely Kalman 
Filters) internal to the INS. Load factor from high-G maneuvers can cause deformation of the 
sensor which affects the readings. Since the FQ-BIT is performed in steady-state level flight, this 
error source is disregarded. Temperature fluctuations are disregarded with the assumption that 
environmental conditions will not exceed design limits. 
INS determines angles by integrating the rotation rate over time, and sensor fusion algorithms 
mesh the integration results (which have unbounded errors) with other sensor readings (such as 
GPS) to keep the error within the acceptable bounds. Ignoring the sensor fusion part, the noise of 
the integration output can be 
specified in three formats: 
function of frequency using 
power spectral density (PSD) 
or Fast Fourier Transform 
(FFT), and function of time 
using angle random walk 
(ARW). ARW is usually used 
in specification of INS 
because it represents the root-
 
 
Figure 31. Integrated angle noise. [ref Stockwell] 
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mean-squares error. ARW is a noise specification is in units of angle per square-root of time that 
directly the average deviation that occurs with integration. Because the integration process 
involves time, ARW is also a function of time. The statistical distribution, described by the 
standard distribution, of noise is linearly scaled with the noise level (deg) and with the square root 
of time (√hr). ARW is assumed to be a Gaussian white noise process, and hence, has a normal 
distribution13. An integration of ARW is shown in Figure 31.  
Bias results from error in the sensor fusion process (e.g. Kalman filter). Referencing the 
Kalman filter architecture in Figure 18, the state propagation portion represents the integration of 
angular rates to obtain angles. The measurement comes from another sensor such as a GPS. The 
measurement update 
process fuses the 
inertial and GPS 
measurements together. 
Being a statistical 
process, the error is 
never driven to zero as 
nothing is absolutely certain, which results in a constant offset. Figure 32 compares the 
unbounded error of the pure integration against the bounded bias error of the embedded GPS/INS 
(EGI). 
To characterize noise and bias, manufacturer spec-sheets26 are consulted. Noise is assumed to 
a Gaussian white noise process with a 1-σ value of 0.15 deg/√hr 24. The bias error comes from 
the integration of noise and is provided in units of deg/hr. Fibre optic gyros have shown to display 
about 0.025 deg/hr of bias26.  
 
 
Figure 32. Sensor fusion. 
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2. ADS 
Angle of attack can be measured by the ADS 
through two methods: vane (illustrated in Figure 33) 
or pitot-static. The vane type sensor works by aligning 
the vane with the airflow and the difference between 
the vane and tare angle is the difference between the 
air-path axis and body axis respectively. This is the angle-of-attack. The pitot-static based sensor 
has two ports angled differently; the difference between the pressure-readings can be used to 
solve for the angle-of-attack. Due to the scarcity of open-sure literatures for error of pitot-static 
alpha sensors, the type is disregarded for the purposes of this paper.  
ADS data is often processed before being used by the flight controls program. One such 
algorithm, a first-order complementary filter, is illustrated and simulated with the bias of 0.125 
deg and noise of 0.05 deg (1-σ) in Figure 34 to demonstrate the functionality. Note the ability of 
the filter to suppress the noise but not the bias error. To remain conservative, no filtering is 
assumed in the SID algorithm selection 
process. Literature quotes the 
performance of a vane type sensor as 
having a total error less than ±0.25 deg31. 
Due to a shortage of information as most 
companies regard this information as 
proprietary, the bias is arbitrarily set at 
±0.1 deg and noise at a 1-σ value of 0.05 
deg with Gaussian white noise 
properties. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 34. Complementary Filter (τ=2) 
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Figure 33. Vane sensor. 
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The bias error and noise properties as described above are synthesized for use in the SID 
algorithm evaluations. Three sensor test cases are used: noise only, bias only, and noise with bias. 
Each case allows the evaluation of the SID algorithm with each type of sensor error; the noise 
with bias case presents the worst-case scenario as a “stress-test” of the algorithm.  
C. Input Waveform (Evaluation) 
1. Candidates 
Besides the doublet, three additional waveforms were considered: 3-2-1-1, pulse, and natural 
turbulence. NASA had investigated other waveforms such as the sinusoid for stability derivative 
(parameter) estimation, but found them wanting32. The lack of clearly defined edges leads to a 
subpar estimate. In addition, system identification makes the assumption that flight conditions 
(such as Mach number and altitude) remain constant; while other input waveforms allow the air 
vehicle to remained trimmed, sine waves (especially long sweeping inputs) tend to vary the flight 
conditions, further degrading their results. In Figure 35, note the poor estimate as well as large 
error bounds exhibited by the sine wave inputs.  
 
 
Figure 35. Inputs compared. Chart reproduced from NASA report32. 
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Since the FQ-BIT is aimed at serving large UAS 
that are likely to be subsonic and possess highly 
augmented (tight) control systems, the sinusoidal 
input is discounted and 3-2-1-1, doublet, pulse, and 
turbulence inputs investigated. For a description of 
the doublet input, refer to the system description 
section, subsection A. 
A 3-2-1-1 waveform is illustrated in Figure 36. The maneuver is so named because it provides 
input in time duration of three, two, one, and one, with the direction of the input reversing at 
every new time bin. Input energy is spread out (lower amplitude) because of the long duration. 
On the positive, the low amplitude maintains the linearity assumption. Additionally, the different 
time duration acts like a pseudo-frequency sweep, which can benefit frequency-domain based 
SID algorithms. The drawback is that the low amplitude input yields less accurate results due to 
lower SNR and corner-rounding from the inner-loop autopilot. The long duration may also violate 
the assumption that flight conditions stay the same. Because of these issues, the 3-2-1-1 
waveform is rejected. 
A pulse waveform displayed in Figure 37 has a high magnitude that gives good signal-to-noise 
ratio. The input is designed to mimic the Dirac delta function, the length of the pulse is set to 
account for actuator response time. The short 
duration of the pulse means it is less likely to 
induce oscillations. However, the high magnitude 
input may violate the linearity assumption of SID 
algorithms. A series of tests are conducted to 
further characterize the pulse waveform. 
 
 
Figure 36. 3-2-1-1. 
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Figure 37. Pulse. 
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A natural source of input is turbulence. The inner-loop controller issues control surface 
commands to maintain the desired flight path in the presence of turbulence. This creates a 
correlation between the control surface activity and the response of the air vehicle which an SID 
algorithm can exploit. With the minimal disturbance to flight path, turbulence has the benefit of 
being easily adaptable for a continuous FQ-BIT implementation. However, the frequency and 
magnitude of the turbulence encountered are uncertain so that it may be unreliable. In addition, 
the turbulence input is not exactly known or repeatable (in contrast to a pulse or doublet), which 
introduces process noise and can degrade the solution.  
Turbulence is simulated by the Dryden discrete turbulence model as published in MILSPEC 
8785, which is a stochastic process. Given the altitude and wingspan or the vehicle, wind 
velocities are generated along all three axes. The wind speed at ground level of 10ft/s is defined 
 
 
Figure 38. Turbulence intensity. 
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to set the moderate wind magnitude for the model. A “medium severity” probability of 
exceedance is selected. The turbulence intensity is determined from a lookup table (graphed in 
Figure 38) as a function of altitude, and the probability of exceedance gives the probability that 
the turbulence intensity exceeds the table lookup value. The turbulence acts as an input to which 
the autopilot of the air vehicle responds with control surface commands.  
2. Evaluation Methods 
To choose between the waveforms, the estimation results must be compared against the truth 
data using a metric for accuracy. The norm of ?̂?𝐴,𝐵𝐵�  can be compared against the norm of A, B. 
However, there are dizzying variety of norms available (max-norm, Frobenius-norm, Schatten-
norm, etc) with no clear directions on which is best. In addition, norm is only a scalar value and 
provides no information on convergence or trends. In contrast, by simulating the states using ?̂?𝐴,𝐵𝐵�  
and input u to get 𝑦𝑦�, a frame-by-frame comparison can be made against the recorded response (y). 
All candidate SID algorithms are used to process 𝑦𝑦� in order to determine if any correlation exists 
between SID algorithm and input waveform. The sensors are assumed to be perfect (no noise, 
bias, etc) for the purpose of this test. The plant used is the longitudinal linear plant because it is 
the easiest estimation problem. Because EUDKF is a stochastic process, fifty Monte Carlo trials 
are run and the ensemble of data at each time step are processed by the root-mean-squares (RMS) 
error equation: 
��
1
𝑘𝑘
(𝑦𝑦�𝑁𝑁 − 𝑦𝑦𝑁𝑁)2𝑘𝑘
𝑁𝑁=1  
The results are evaluated based on transient behaviour, convergence rate, and steady-state error.  
To test the effectiveness of atmospheric turbulence as an input waveform, a 15sec long 
simulation is built in SIMULINK for testing. The block “Dryden Wind Turbulence Model” is 
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used to generate the wind gusts with horizontal, vertical, and lateral components. The Dryden 
model generates gusts that smoothly ramp from zero velocity to the gust magnitude, stay at that 
magnitude for a period of them, then ramp back to zero. The time duration of the ramps and the 
interval at maximum magnitude, as well as the gust magnitude itself, are stochastic processes that 
follow the models and equations outlined in MILSPEC 8785. For the purposes of this evaluation, 
the air vehicle altitude is considered to be invariant at 5000ft; in addition, the roll and yaw angles 
are assumed to be invariant at zero as well. The aircraft plant is the linear time-invariant 
representation of the longitudinal dynamics of a Cessna 172 at an altitude of 5000ft and airspeed 
of 120kts. Because only the longitudinal dynamics are simulated, the lateral wind gust is not used. 
The plant incorporates the horizontal turbulence by adding it to the airspeed state. The vertical 
turbulence is incorporated by calculating the induced angle-of-attack, and then adding it to the 
corresponding state. An altitude hold autopilot is constructed with altitude rate feedback. The 
airspeed is multiplied by the pitch angle (small angle approximation is assumed to remove the 
sine function on θ) to represent altitude rate. A proportional gain feedback is used to generate the 
elevator command. The block diagram of this simulation setup is displayed in Figure 39. The 
power spectral density of the horizontal and vertical wind gusts from the Dryden model is 
 
 
Figure 39. Turbulence SIMULINK model setup. 
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displayed in Figure 40. 
Note that turbulence is 
mostly concentrated at low 
frequencies.  
The resulting states and 
elevator movements from 
the turbulence are 
recorded, processed by the 
SID algorithm, and the 
estimated states generated. 
The RMS equation is again 
applied to evaluate the usefulness of turbulence as an input.  
D. SID Algorithm (Evaluation) 
In addition to Extended UD Factorized Kalman Filter (EUDFK), two other methods were 
considered: Equation Error (Time Domain) and Equation Error (Frequency Domain) methods. 
Output error method is not considered due to the long runtime (fifteen to thirty minutes) and 
occasional instability observed by the author in industry use. For a description of EUDKF, the 
reader is referred to the system description section, subsection A. 
Unlike EUDKF, equation error is a deterministic batch filter which operates on all the 
measurements; it is also a “one-step” method that performs all the computation once whereas 
EUDKF performs the same steps recursively for each data measurement. Equation error was one 
of the first analytical techniques used to estimate aircraft dynamic model parameters from flight 
data; modern updates to the method had negated much of earlier problems22. In essence, equation 
error is the linear least squares problem in matrix form. It assumes the system is linear time-
 
Figure 40. Turbulence power-signal-density. 
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invariant, the measurements are known without error, and that noise is Gaussian white noise. The 
method utilizes relatively elementary and undemanding mathematical operations. Being a batch 
filter however, it processes all the measurements at once, and the large number of measurements 
(large matrix sizes) makes matrix multiplications expensive propositions. In addition, the 
algorithm cannot process the data until all measurements are gathered. This concentrates all the 
computational requirements in one short time period, which may affect the other programs being 
run.  
The estimation error is a linear function of the measurement error. If no measurement noise is 
present, then the estimated value is a deterministic quantity exactly equal to the plant (assuming 
no process noise). In the presence of noise, the estimated value becomes stochastic and possibly 
biased. For an unbiased estimation, the residuals have a zero mean; this property can be used to 
detect sensor bias. 
1. Candidates 
Two variations of the equation error method are considered: one operating in the time domain, 
the other in the frequency domain.  
Equation Error (Time Domain) 
The central idea of the least squares method revolves around minimizing the errors expressed 
in a cost function. Starting with the state space formulation of the problem, the error, cost 
function, and solution are derived below. The state equation can be written as, 
(12) 
With the subscript m denoting measurement, the error (ε) can be written as, 
(13) 
BuAxx +=
mmmm BuAxxxx −−=−= ε
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If the A and B matrices along with xm and um vectors are collected together, their augmented 
forms can be written as,  
 
 
(14) 
Then equation 13 can be rewritten, 
(15) 
Using the deterministic least squared method, the cost function to be minimized can be written as, 
(16) 
To minimize J, the first derivative is taken with respect to xam and set to zero. This results in the 
estimated augmented matrix.  
(17) 
The residuals are,  
(18) 
Equation Error (Freq Domain) 
Time domain methods have the advantage that measurements are sampled in discrete time 
domain form and ready for processing. Frequency domain methods, despite the additional 
computational requirements for the transformation, can prove advantageous due to the sampling 
window acting like a band-pass filter so as to focus only on the area(s) of interest. The lower 
frequency bound is set higher than the sensor drift rate; the high frequency bound is set lower 
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than the structural resonance to exclude undesirable dynamics. As a bonus, this frequency domain 
technique is less dependent on sharp input corners than its time domain cousin29.  
The window size is chosen between half of the sampling rate and 1/8Hz. Of all the air vehicle 
modes both longitudinal and lateral, the short period mode is expected to be the fastest with a 
nominal period no more than four seconds (or 1/4Hz). With this assumption, the minimum 
window frequency is set at 1/8Hz for added margins. The maximum window frequency is set by 
the critical frequency of the Nyquist-Shannon sampling theorem. For example, if the sampling 
rate is 50Hz, then the highest discernable (and maximum window) frequency is 25Hz.  
The number of frequency bins is chosen as the next higher multiple of two of the sample size; 
e.g. 500 samples would have 512 frequency bins. The number of bins is a multiple of two so as to 
increase Fast Fourier Transform (FFT) 
efficiency. In addition, the frequency 
resolution is refined to be at least 0.04Hz or 
better; e.g. the frequency resolution of 512 
bins is 0.5Hz, then the bins are increased until 
the resolution is at least 0.04Hz 
(512bins×0.5Hz÷0.04Hz = 6400bins) which is 
then raised to the next multiple of two 
(8192bins). The algorithm thus far has spread the bins evenly across the frequency spectrum, but 
additional bins are desirable in the area of interest. In the longitudinal case, additional bins are 
added between 1/2Hz and 1/4Hz for enhanced resolution near the expected short period 
frequency with the resulting histogram displayed in Figure 41 (note that the period is displayed 
instead of frequency for clarity). The nominal periods of the lateral modes are more difficult to 
characterize and the frequency bins remain un-augmented.  
 
Figure 41. Histogram of frequency range 
(displayed in period for clarity).  
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The only difference between the mechanization of equation error in time domain and 
frequency domain is that the later is comprised of both real and complex numbers. The derivation 
process follows the same broad strokes. The discrete Fourier transform can be written as,  
(19) 
Rewriting the state equation in the frequency domain, the following results, 
(20) 
Following the same logic as the time domain method, the cost function can be written as, 
(21) 
where m is the number of bins used in the Fourier transform, 𝑥𝑥�𝑘𝑘(𝑛𝑛) denotes the k-th element of 𝑥𝑥� 
for 𝜔𝜔𝑛𝑛 , and 𝐴𝐴𝑘𝑘and 𝐵𝐵𝑘𝑘denote the k-th row of the matrix.  
By defining the X and Y the following way, 
 
 
(22) 
 
the cost function can be rewritten as, 
(23) 
where * denotes the complex conjugate transpose and θ is, 
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The minimum of the cost function is met with the following criteria, 
(25) 
where Re( ) means the real part of the matrix. Note that equation 25 is the same as equation 18 if 
only real numbers are concerned.  
 
2. Evaluation Methods 
In order to evaluate the 
three SID candidates, each 
combination of air vehicle 
plant and sensor must be 
tested. Two plant types (linear 
and non-linear), four sensor 
error types (no error, noise 
corruption, bias offset, noise and bias together), and three candidate SID algorithms (equation 
error in time domain, equation error in frequency domain, and EUDKF) combine to form twenty-
four test conditions for both longitudinal and lateral dynamics. This means forty eight total tests 
are performed.  
The test process outlined in Figure 42 uses the selected input waveform (doublet) to excite the 
plant (two flavors), and then the signal is injected with sensor noise (four choices), finally the 
signal is routed through the SID algorithm under test (three selections). The resulting ?̂?𝐴,𝐵𝐵�  are 
used to generate the estimated system response (𝑦𝑦�), which is then compared against the true 
system response y using the root-mean-squares (RMS) error metric shown below, 
( )[ ] ( )YXXX TT ReReˆ 1−=θ
 
Figure 42. Evaluation Process. 
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��
1
𝑘𝑘
(𝑦𝑦�𝑁𝑁 − 𝑦𝑦𝑁𝑁)2𝑘𝑘
𝑁𝑁=1  
In order to more easily interpret the results, they are separated into two categories: linear plant 
and non-linear plant. In each category, the four sensor-error types are presented separately. 
Finally, in each sensor-error type, the RMS errors of each state resulting from all three SID 
algorithms are plotted together so as to give an “apples-to-apples” comparison that allows one to 
draw conclusions as to whether a SID algorithm is universally superior, under certain 
circumstances, or otherwise.   
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V. Test Results 
A. Input Waveform 
Turbulence 
Fifty Monte Carlo trials were performed to obtain the results in Figure 43 thru Figure 46. Note 
that both equation error methods (time domain and frequency domain) diverged and were 
not plotted. The red lines in the figures represent the RMS error from EUDKF. The significance 
of the results is discussed in chapter VI. 
 
 
  
 
 
Figure 43. Turbulence error, no sensor noise, linear Cessna 172 longitudinal plant. 
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Figure 45. Turbulence error, with sensor bias, linear Cessna 172 longitudinal plant. 
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Figure 44. Turbulence error, with sensor noise, linear Cessna 172 longitudinal plant. 
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Doublet vs. Pulse 
Fifty Monte Carlo trials were performed using the linear Cessna 172 longitudinal plant. The 
RMS errors of the pulse input waveforms are shown in Figure 47 while the RMS errors of the 
doublet input waveform are shown in Figure 48. Note that in Figure 47, equation error 
(frequency domain) method diverged and the results were not plotted. The significance of the 
results is discussed in chapter VI. 
 
 
Figure 46. Turbulence error, with sensor noise and bias, linear Cessna 172 longitudinal plant. 
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Figure 48. Pulse error, no sensor noise, linear Cessna 172 longitudinal plant. 
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Figure 47. Pulse error, no sensor noise, linear Cessna 172 longitudinal plant. 
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B. SID Algorithm 
Fifty Monte Carlo trials were performed for each of the following charts. The results with the 
longitudinal linear plant are presented in Figure 49 thru Figure 52. The results with the 
longitudinal nonlinear plant are presented in Figure 53 thru Figure 56. The results with the lateral 
linear plant are presented in Figure 57 thru Figure 60. The results with the lateral nonlinear plant 
are presented in Figure 61 thru Figure 64. Note that equation error (frequency domain) 
method universally diverged and the results were not plotted. The significance of the results 
is discussed in chapter VI.  
 
 
Figure 49. SID RMS error, no sensor error, linear longitudinal plant 
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Figure 50. SID RMS error, with sensor noise, linear longitudinal plant 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 51. SID RMS error, with sensor bias, linear longitudinal plant 
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Figure 52. SID RMS error, with sensor noise and bias, linear longitudinal plant 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 53. SID RMS error, no sensor error, nonlinear longitudinal plant 
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Figure 54. SID RMS error, with sensor noise, nonlinear longitudinal plant 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 55. SID RMS error, with sensor bias, nonlinear longitudinal plant 
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Figure 56. SID RMS error, with sensor noise and bias, nonlinear longitudinal plant 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 57. SID RMS error, no sensor error, linear lateral plant 
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Figure 58. SID RMS error, with sensor noise, linear lateral plant 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 59. SID RMS error, with sensor bias, linear lateral plant 
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Figure 60. SID RMS error, with sensor noise and bias, linear lateral plant 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 61. SID RMS error, no sensor error, nonlinear lateral plant 
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Figure 62. SID RMS error, with sensor noise, nonlinear lateral plant 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 63. SID RMS error, with sensor bias, nonlinear lateral plant 
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Figure 64. SID RMS error, with sensor noise and bias, nonlinear lateral plant 
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VI. Analysis 
A. Input Waveform 
Turbulence  
Both equation error methods diverged quickly and their RMS errors were not plotted. There 
was not enough energy content in the appropriate frequencies for the equation error methods to 
generate good estimates. The short, sharp gust portion of turbulence inputs were averaged out by 
the method due to their Gaussian, zero-mean, statistical properties. The long period gusts were 
not able to excite the system enough for a good estimate.  
Even the mathematically sophisticated Extended UD factorized Kalman Filter was only able to 
generate a poor estimate. The diverging trends in the RMS error of both states indicated a 
persistent error in the system estimate. Through the noise in q, it was observable that the error 
was diverging. This was due to the fact that the input (refer to Figure 40) was not a white noise 
function. However, one cannot filter a physical phenomenon to improve EUDKF performance. 
The poor estimate from EUDKF indicated that it was not suitable for use by FQ-BIT.  
 Regardless of sensor noise, RMS error divergence was observed with all three SID 
algorithms. Both equation error methods diverged spectacularly. EUDKF was only able to 
generate a poor estimate that nevertheless showed divergent trends in all RMS errors. The poor 
performance, lack of regularity, and the general unpredictable nature led to the elimination of 
turbulence as a valid input waveform.  
Doublet vs. Pulse 
In examining Figure 47 and Figure 48, it was easily observed that the RMS error behaviors in 
both α and q showed the same trends. The pulse input showed a diverging trend in error. In 
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addition, the equation error method in frequency domain diverged and was not plotted while it 
converged with a doublet input and was plotted in Figure 48. The order of magnitude in RMS 
error showed the superiority of the doublet input; the pulse RMS error was O(10-2) while the 
doublet RMS error was O(10-3). The linearly-growing RMS error (ten to fifteen second segment) 
observed with both equation error (time domain) method and EUDKF in pulse input was 
consistent with a steady-state error in the system estimate. Since the pulse maneuver was 
completed by t=3, and the lack of dynamic spikes indicated that the transients had settled down 
by t=10, the steady-state growth of RMS error indicated a sample-invariant error in the estimate.  
The RMS error divergent trends and higher error order of magnitude with the pulse input 
showed it to be a poor input waveform choice. In addition, the high magnitude input may violate 
the linearity assumption. Hence, the doublet was established as the best of the input waveform 
candidates. The tests to evaluate SID algorithm candidates were conducted with a doublet input.   
B. SID Algorithm 
Longitudinal Linear Plant 
First analyzing the results tested with a linear plant of the longitudinal dynamics, it was noted 
EUDKF consistently performed the best in view of four differing sensor error types. Equation 
error (time domain) method performed only slightly worse than EUDKF as sensor error increased 
in complexity. Equation error (frequency domain) method performed better than EUDKF with a 
perfect sensor, but noise caused divergence and bias markedly deteriorated the solution.  
In no-noise case (Figure 49), the equation error (frequency domain) method performed the best 
with EUDKF a close second. Equation error (time domain) method performed the worst. This 
showed the power of the frequency domain technique when no corruption exists. When sensor 
noise was added (Figure 50), the flaw of the equation error (frequency domain) method shows 
itself in the divergent trend. Also, the more sophisticated mathematical techniques of EUDKF 
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showed its worth by performing better than the equation error (time domain) technique. In face of 
sensor bias (Figure 51), equation error (frequency domain) method converged, but excessive 
RMS error was observed. Meanwhile, EUDKF and equation error (time domain) method show 
similar transient performance. With both sensor noise and bias (Figure 52), equation error 
(frequency domain) showed problems in converging. The convergence with bias still managed to 
overpower the divergence tendencies with noise so that the technique was globally convergent, 
albeit with large transient errors. Again, EUDKF and equation error (time domain) techniques 
were similar in performance with EUDKF showing better transients.  
Considering the results from all four sensor error types, EUDKF converged the fastest with the 
least transient error. Equation error (time domain) method was a close second. This is by no-
means an invalidation of the sophisticated mathematical techniques of EUDKF, but merely a 
reflection of the fact that it was a non-optimal solution for a linear problem due to the numerical 
errors stemming from the Jacobian calculation. Equation error (frequency domain) method was 
prone to divergence; this property was observed throughout all the tests performed. 
Longitudinal Nonlinear Plant 
While staying in the realm of longitudinal dynamics, a nonlinear plant was substituted and the 
same set of tests repeated. In such environment, equation error (frequency domain) again showed 
the divergent trends. In addition, EUDKF showed unequivocal superiority over the equation error 
(time domain) method.  
In all cases, equation error (frequency domain) method showed an oscillating trend in the 
RMS error. This indicated an overly-estimated sensitivity in the 𝐵𝐵�  matrix. With each control 
input, the estimated measurements (𝑦𝑦�) showed an over-reaction in comparison with the truth 
measurements (y). It was also noticeable that the RMS errors in equation error (frequency 
domain) method, while bounded, did not approach zero. With the equation error (time domain) 
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method, the RMS error approached zero exponentially after the transients died down (post t=10). 
This reflected the averaging nature of the method where the error incrementally approached zero. 
In contrast, EUDKF abruptly went to zero in a discontinuous fashion due to the statistical 
probability calculations of the method. While EUDKF showed higher peak RMS error than 
equation error (time domain) method, the overall RMS error (“area under the curve”) was 
favorable to EUDKF.  
In the case of a nonlinear plant, equation error (frequency domain) method showed its 
instability. EUDKF was superior to equation error (time domain) method because it was designed 
to deal with a nonlinear plant. In addition, its sophisticated mathematical techniques allowed it to 
minimize the overall RMS error.  
Lateral Linear Plant 
In examining the lateral dynamics, the linear plant was first tested. EUDKF proved superior 
not because it consistently had the least RMS error, but because both equation error methods 
diverged. Equation error (frequency domain) dramatically diverged and was not plotted.  
In the no-noise case (Figure 57), equation error (time domain) method consistently showed 
slightly better performance across all states. It was noteworthy that both equation error (time 
domain) and EUDKF showed steady-state RMS error in the “slow” states of [ϕ,ψ]. This was 
potentially due to the fact the input waveform did not adequately excite the slow states. The fast 
states, being more excitable, did not show this deficiency. In the case with sensor noise (Figure 
58), equation error (time domain) diverged. With sensor bias (Figure 59), equation error (time 
domain) showed markedly better performance than EUDKF. However, in the face of both noise 
and bias (Figure 60), equation error (time domain) diverged in [β] even though EUDKF showed 
the transient spikes of RMS error across all five states. Equation error (time domain) managed to 
converge with a quite small RMS error in the other four states as the convergent tendencies 
overpowered the divergent trend from sensor bias.  
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In the case of a linear lateral plant, EUDKF proved the superior method. Equation error 
(frequency domain) method diverged in all four sensor error cases. Equation error (time domain) 
method diverged in face of sensor bias but otherwise performed quite well. While the problem of 
using EUDKF to estimate a linear system showed itself, the robustness of the method decisively 
favored the technique.  
Lateral Nonlinear Plant 
In the test suites performed with a lateral nonlinear plant, the superiority of EUDKF was not 
quite so clearly established. Equation error (time domain) and EUDKF both showed superiority in 
different situations. Meanwhile, equation error (frequency domain) method diverged and was not 
plotted.  
As explained in the previous paragraphs, the RMS errors in both slow states showed 
divergence with EUDKF being the worst offender of the two. In some cases such as in Figure 62, 
the ability of the EUDKF to abruptly reduce the error while equation error (time domain) 
incrementally averaged out the error was seen in [β,p,r] states past t=20. In the case of sensor bias 
(Figure 63), EUDKF showed less RMS error than equation error (time domain) in the fast states. 
This was likely due to the assumption made by the equation error method that the error was zero-
mean being violated. However, equation error (time domain) method showed less RMS error in 
estimating with the roll input in Figure 64. Both methods showed superiority under different 
situations.  
While the lateral nonlinear plant provided no conclusive guidance on EUDKF vs. equation 
error (time domain), it reinforced the observation that equation error (frequency domain) was 
prone to divergence.  
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Summary 
EUDKF showed superiority in linear and non-linear longitudinal dynamics, as well as linear 
lateral dynamics. EUDKF and equation error (time domain) showed pre-eminence under different 
situations with non-linear lateral dynamics. Overall, EUDKF showed superiority in minimizing 
RMS error, convergence time, and stability.  
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VII. Conclusions 
FQ-BIT increased safety margins on UAS by reliably providing the AVO with accurate real-
time flying qualities assessments. The design choices documented in this work showed the 
robustness, accuracy, and relevance of the metrics generated. In addition, FQ-BIT interfaced with 
the human operator in a clear and concise manner to facilitate swift and well-informed decision 
making. While the FQ-BIT is automated, a human is always in-the-loop; the data interpretation 
and final decision is left to the human. 
The FQ-BIT used a doublet input waveform. [α,q] and [β,ϕ,p,ψ,r] were states gathered for 
processing in the longitudinal and lateral axis respectively. Extended UD-factorized Kalman 
Filter generated a linear-time-invariant state equation approximation in state-space form. Flying 
qualities metrics in the form of τ, ζ, ω, gain margin, phase margin, observability, and 
controllability were calculated. The results are displayed to the AVO in a color-coded, easy to 
interpret display. In addition to providing additional safety to operational UASs, FQ-BIT can be 
used in envelope-expansion flight tests where the real-time results can reduce risks and result in 
time and cost savings. 
Future work on FQ-BIT includes tuning the EUDKF to better track the slow states in the 
lateral axis and to achieve unequivocal superiority over equation error (time domain) method. In 
addition, other SID algorithms can be investigated for use as a “sanity check” against the EUDKF 
results. An air vehicle dependent improvement involves investigating the use of regular artificial 
disturbances small in magnitude to provide continuous flying qualities monitoring (FQ-CBIT). 
 For a copy of the MATLAB files accompanying this work, please contact the aerospace 
department at California Polytechnic State University, San Luis Obispo.   
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APPENDIX 
A. USAF UAS Class A Mishap FY 2000 to 2010 
Date AV  Failure Type 
29-Nov-07 MQ-1L Comms Failure 
20-Nov-10 MQ-1B Electrical Failure 
22-Feb-09 MQ-1B Electrical Failure 
20-Apr-09 MQ-1B Electrical Failure 
17-Dec-07 MQ-1B Electrical Failure 
8-May-09 MQ-1B FCS Failure 
14-Sep-09 MQ-1B FCS Failure 
30-Dec-01 RQ-4A FCS Failure 
17-May-02 RQ-1L FCS Failure 
4-Oct-00 RQ-1L FCS Failure 
17-Sep-02 RQ-1L Hazardous Meteorological Conditions 
6-Dec-99 RQ-4A Mission Planning Error 
9-Dec-10 MQ-1B Pilot Error 
31-Aug-10 MQ-9 Pilot Error 
16-Aug-10 MQ-1B Pilot Error 
28-Jul-10 MQ-1B Pilot Error 
20-Apr-10 MQ-1B Pilot Error 
3-Oct-09 MQ-1B Pilot Error 
26-Mar-07 MQ-1B Pilot Error 
21-Oct-05 MQ-9 Pilot Error 
20-Mar-06 MQ-1 Pilot Error 
3-Aug-06 MQ-1B Pilot Error 
13-Oct-04 MQ-1B Pilot Error 
24-Nov-04 MQ-1L Pilot Error 
14-Jun-04 MQ-1L Pilot Error 
22-Sep-04 MQ-1L Pilot Error 
25-Oct-02 RQ-1L Pilot Error 
22-Jan-02 RQ-1L Pilot Error 
25-Jan-02 RQ-1B Pilot Error 
30-Mar-01 RQ-1L Pilot Error 
14-Sep-00 RQ-1L Pilot Error 
11-Dec-03 RQ-1 Pilot Error / FCS Failure 
5-May-11 MQ-1B Propulsion Failure 
19-Sep-10 MQ-1B Propulsion Failure 
19-Oct-08 MQ-1B Propulsion Failure 
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20-Mar-09 MQ-9 Propulsion Failure 
28-Apr-09 MQ-1B Propulsion Failure 
13-Aug-09 MQ-1B Propulsion Failure 
4-Sep-09 MQ-1B Propulsion Failure 
17-Jan-07 MQ-1B Propulsion Failure 
23-Feb-07 MQ-1B Propulsion Failure 
30-Jul-07 MQ-1B Propulsion Failure 
31-Jul-07 MQ-1B Propulsion Failure 
22-Jun-06 MQ-1L Propulsion Failure 
27-Mar-05 RQ-1L Propulsion Failure 
30-Mar-05 RQ-1L Propulsion Failure 
17-Aug-04 MQ-1L Propulsion Failure 
1-Jan-03 RQ-1B Propulsion Failure 
25-May-02 RQ-1B Propulsion Failure 
10-Jul-02 RQ-4A Propulsion Failure 
23-Oct-00 RQ-1K Propulsion Failure 
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B. Linear Plant (State-Space)  
Cessna 172, 5000ft, 120kt VTAS 
 
1. Longitudinal 
A = 
    
  
VTAS α θ q 
 
VTAS -0.04422 18.74408 -32.2 0 
 
alpha -0.00135 -2.20202 0 0.97925 
 
theta 0 0 0 1 
 
q 0.00244 -23.72524 0 -6.13122 
      
      B = 
    
  
δe 
   
 
VTAS -6.24803 
   
 
α -0.20446 
   
 
θ 0 
   
 
q -39.48824 
    
 
 
2. Lateral 
 
A = 
     
  
β ϕ p ψ r 
 
β -0.1474 0.14703 -0.00144 0 -0.99184 
 
ϕ 0 0 1 0 0 
 
p -28.74922 0 -12.40917 0 2.53464 
 
ψ 0 0 0 0 1 
 
r 10.11937 0 -0.38174 0 -1.25975 
       
       B = 
     
  
δa δr 
   
 
β 0 0.08892 
   
 
ϕ 0 0 
   
 
p 57.49844 4.74847 
   
 
ψ 0 0 
   
 
r -8.25118 -10.22835 
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